Attack and Defense Strategies in Cyber-Physical Systems with Varying Levels of System and Opponent Knowledge
2018-12-13T19:50:40Z (GMT) by
Advances in computing, communications, and sensing have enabled exciting opportunities for<br>large scale applications of cyber-physical systems (CPS) to energy, transportation, healthcare,<br>and defense. All of these services support critical applications, making CPS security crucial.<br>For example, an attack against the smart-grid, or a power grid enhanced with CPS, may result in<br>devastating regional blackouts. Fortunately, the technologies that enable CPS allows us to design<br>attack and defense strategies leveraging robust sensing and actuation.<br>In this thesis, we explore the interaction of two adversarial players with a shared cyberphysical<br>system. We investigate how a player with limited information about the CPS or their<br>opponent chooses an attack or defense. In particular, we explore the following question: how is<br>an agent’s strategy affected by the amount of knowledge they have about the CPS they interact<br>with and their opponent’s strategy?<br>We consider various scenarios to explore this problem including: an agent that interacts<br>with a known system and known opponent, an agent that interacts with a known system and an<br>opponent with assumed behavior, an agent that interacts with a known system and an unknown<br>opponent, and an agent that interacts with a known opponent and a partially known system. For<br>each of these scenarios we provide a proof-of-concept attack or defense to demonstrate security<br>challenges and opportunities. We also introduce other scenarios based on system and opponent<br>knowledge levels that demonstrates exciting future research opportunities.